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ABSTRACT
Complex projects typically involve high-consequence, project-specific risks that require detailed analysis
and for which risk response actions (RRAs) need to be developed and implemented. The risk picture is
dynamic. The sources and consequences of risks evolve and change over the project lifecycle; thus, it is
necessary to constantly monitor risk. RRAs that do not keep pace with the changing project situation are
a major cause of risk management failures. This paper extends traditional cost risk analysis from a purely
macroscopic perspective by evaluating and tracking project-specific risks and RRAs at the microscopic
level. The key elements of the method are (i) develop risk scenarios, (ii) model them using generalized
decision trees, and (iii) quantify the risks using Monte Carlo simulation. For each risk the probability and
cost values are conditional on the specific RRA and the preceding outcomes. The use of fractional factorial
design provides a subset of all possible RRA combinations for efficiently determining the preferred total
project RRA solution. Risk curves are generated to provide the necessary information to analyze, track,
and manage the performance of the selected RRAs over time. Project managers and team leaders can use
this information to dynamically manage the RRAs to keep pace with the changing project situation, thereby
increasing the probability of project success in a cost-effective manner. The approach is detailed using a
realistic but simplified case of a project examined first with one and then expanded to three technical
risks. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Syst Eng  13: 353–368, 2010
Key words: risk analysis; technical risk; risk response actions; decision tree; risk curves; risk dependencies;
correlation; risk dynamics; microscopic analysis; Monte Carlo simulation; design of experiments
1. INTRODUCTION
Complex engineering projects are susceptible to project-spe-
cific risk drivers such as low Technology Readiness Level
(TRL), high-design and/or manufacturing complexity, sig-
nificant requirement changes, sizeable quantity changes,
large funding uncertainty, severe acts of nature, serious acci-
dents, and poor management decisions [Sage, 1992; Chap-
man and Ward, 1997; Conrow, 2003; U.S. Government Ac-
countability Office, 2009]. These risk factors must be
identified, assessed, mitigated, and controlled through formal
risk management. The latter is an essential and critical disci-
pline that is implemented in many of today’s complex engi-
neering projects/programs (referred to simply as “projects” in
this paper). Probabilistic Cost Risk Analysis (PCRA) pro-
vides a proper framework for handling the many different
elements of cost uncertainties, including project-specific,
high-consequence outcomes that result from failure to meet
technical performance requirements. Figure 1 depicts PCRA
as an integral part of the risk management process. To be
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effective, PCRA should interface with the risk management
activities, be regularly updated to reflect change in risk, and
be integrated within the project’s Earned Value Management
System (EVMS) [NDIA-PMSC, 2005].
The emphasis on risk management supports efforts to
reduce lifecycle costs of system acquisitions. Analysis of
performance, cost, and schedule risks over the lifecycle of a
system can yield substantial benefits. Conversely, ignoring
important stages of the lifecycle can lead to substantial risk
for product development at the beginning of the lifecycle and
for product upgrade or replacement at the end [Pennock and
Haimes, 2002]. The lack of and/or inadequate dynamic risk
management has been identified as a major cause of project
failures. The Lockheed Management Student Guide [Waldof,
1998: 53] states:
Risk management efforts that fail do so because the risk
control actions did not keep up with a changing program
situation.
Many sources of cost uncertainty in complex engineering
projects such as economic/business factors (rates-wages,
overhead, vendor/supplier stability, inflation indices, multi-
year assumptions, etc.), learning-rate assumptions, and cost-
reduction initiatives are well understood within the
framework of a macroscopic perspective. These can be effec-
tively modeled with classical Probability Distribution Func-
tions (PDFs) such as the triangular, Beta, lognormal, and
Weibull distributions [Garvey, 2000; Vose, 2006]. These clas-
sical PDFs, however, do not model some of the negative
influences of the acquisition process and human behaviors
such as the MAIMS principle, “Money Allocated Is Money
Spent” [Gordon, 1997; Kujawski, Alvaro, and Edwards,
2004]. The MAIMS principle has important implications for
contingency and risk management [Kujawski, 2007]. Another
important effect is dependencies between cost elements.
These can be accounted for using correlation coefficients
[Book, 2000/2001] or explicitly modeled [Garvey, 2000].
However, even accounting for these additional effects, mac-
roscopic factors constitute only a fraction of today’s typical
project risk drivers and, therefore, cost uncertainty.
Cost, schedule, and technical risks are confounding fac-
tors. Problems meeting technical requirements usually result
in cost overruns and schedule delays. It is tempting to assume
or claim that the classical PDF analysts typically elicit for
cost also quantify the risks associated with project-specific,
high-consequence events. Analysts often go through the
effort of identifying and discussing risk drivers. However,
when it comes to quantifying the risks and estimating cost
contingencies, they simply apply high/low ranges without
thinking about how a particular technical risk driver affects
one or more cost elements. We think that this approach is
incomplete because it (1) masks valuable information and
visibility about important risks and (2) fails to adequately
track RRAs.
Best practices implement the identification of risk drivers
as the kick-off activity of cost risk analysis [Blanchard, 1998;
Smith and Merritt, 2002; INCOSE, 2007]. Hollmann [2007]
explicitly accounts for the risk drivers using their Expected
Values (EVs) in addition to the macroscopic classical PDFs.
He refers to this approach as “Driver-Based Monte-Carlo”
(DBM). This represents a significant improvement over to-
day’s typical Monte Carlo analysis. However, the use of EV
is a major limitation for use in a truly probabilistic framework
where Decision-Makers (DMs) may be confronted with low-
probability, high-consequence outcomes that influence their
psychological biases [Tversky and Kahneman, 1992]. Cle-
men and Reilly [2001: 133] write:
Comparing expected values of different risky projects is
useful, but in many cases EV inadequately captures the nature
of the risks that must be compared. With risk profiles, how-
ever, we can make a more comprehensive comparison of the
risks.
The objective of mitigating the technical risk drivers is to
lower both the probability and consequences of cost overruns
and schedule delays while meeting the technical performance.
In this paper we look at the cost impact of technical RRAs,
which we refer to as Technical Risk Cost (TRC). We charac-
terize TRC in terms of cost risk curves, consistent with the
following two definitions of risk:
—“Risk can be quantified by a probability distribution of
the potential outcomes, or by the relevant moments of
that distribution” [Paté-Cornell, 1996: 96].
—“Risk is a measure of future uncertainties in achieving
program performance goals and objectives within de-
fined cost, schedule and performance constraints” [De-
partment of Defense, 2006: 1].
The analysis of specific risk drivers and RRAs requires a
microscopic view (referred to in this paper as the “micro
view”). It is best carried out with tools such as decision trees
(DTs), influence diagrams, or other discrete representations
[Marshall and Oliver, 1995; Kujawski, 2002; Kujawski, Al-
varo, and Edwards, 2004; Haimes, 2004]. We use the micro
Figure 1. The DoD risk management process modified to explicitly
include probabilistic cost risk analysis (adapted from DoD [2006]).
[Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available
at wilyeonlinelibrary.com.]
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view to explicitly model high-consequence events and RRAs
and thereby provide a support tool for better decision-making
[Dillon and Paté-Cornell, 2001]. The micro view also assists
Subject-Matter Experts (SMEs) to think about credible, high-
consequence events and better deal with overconfidence or
optimism biases. However, the micro view is too cumbersome
to individually analyze every technical risk and source of cost
uncertainty. It complements and needs to be integrated within
today’s typical PCRA. The total project cost is then modeled
as the sum of the macroscopic baseline cost (referred to in this
paper as the “macro view”) and the individual TRCs, as
depicted in Figure 2.
In this paper we develop a practical and realistic integrated
micro-macro PRCA approach that project managers and team
leaders can use to dynamically determine RRAs and effec-
tively keep pace with the changing project situation. We focus
on technical risks and quantify the associated TRCs at timely
decision points in terms of risk curves. In Section 2 we discuss
the dynamic picture of project risks and the need for an
integrated micro-macro approach. In Section 3 we present the
use of Generalized Decision Trees (GDTs) and illustrate their
application for the analysis of a single risk with two RRAs as
the project evolves. In Section 4 we extend the approach to
multiple risks and illustrate the method for the realistic but
simplified case of a project with three technical risks. We also
use a fractional factorial design to determine the preferred
TPRRA combination. In Section 5 we discuss and demon-
strate the value of monitoring and dynamically managing
technical risks. We close the paper with some recommenda-
tions for further development.
2. FROM RISK ASSESSMENT TO TOTAL RISK
MANAGEMENT
2.1. The Risk Assessment vs. Risk Management
Paradigms
“Risk management” is an overloaded term. It is used to denote
both (1) the activities following risk assessment and (2) the
entire process of risk assessment and its management. Follow-
ing Haimes [1991], we use the term “total risk management”
for the latter. The standard quantitative risk assessment para-
digm focuses on the following triplet of questions articulated
by Kaplan and Garrick [1981]:
1. What can go wrong?
2. What are the associated likelihoods?
3. What are the consequences?
Once these critical questions have been answered, the
greater challenge of risk management is to address and control
the following three issues articulated by Haimes [1991]:
1. What can be done and what options are available?
2. What are the tradeoffs in terms of costs, benefits, and
risks?
3. What are the impacts of current decisions on future
options?
Successful risk management requires that the above three
critical issues be properly and continuously addressed to
reflect the dynamic character of project risks depicted in
Figure 3 [Murphy et al., 1996; Graham, 2004]. The sources
and consequences of risk continue to evolve and change over
the project lifecycle. The performance of the RRAs needs to
be monitored and controlled to ensure they are adequately
mitigating risk. Depending on the performance, some RRAs
might need to be changed. In general, at any point in time
there will be a mix of acceptable and unacceptable results.
Consequently, management reserves need to be reviewed on
a periodic basis and dynamically allocated where needed to
ensure project success [Kujawski, 2007].
2.2. A Dynamic Risk Management Process
Today’s typical PCRA includes the following steps [Garvey,
2000]:
1. The cost and/or risk analysts (simply referred to as
“analyst” below) and the SMEs jointly identify the
individual risk drivers.
2. The analyst and the SMEs jointly screen the identified
risks for further analysis and risk mitigation.
3. The analyst and the SMEs account for the technical
risks as cost uncertainties within the framework of the
classical cost PDFs.
We now modify and extend the approach as follows:
Figure 2. Total project cost as the sum of the macroscopic baseline
costs and micro risk costs (adapted from Federal Transit Administra-
tion [2004]).
Figure 3. The dynamic picture of project cost risk (adapted from
Federal Transit Administration [2004]).
MONITORING RISK RESPONSE ACTIONS  355
Systems Engineering DOI 10.1002/sys
4. The analyst models the TRC of each technical risk and
selected RRAs over time using a GDT (see Sec. 3).
5. The analyst works with the SMEs to quantify the value
of the decisions and outcomes for each GDT using
discrete and continuous PDFs. We favor the Direct
Fractile Assessment (DFA) method for data elicitation
and fitting the associated cost elements with a three-pa-
rameter Weibull distribution [Brown, 2008].
6. The analyst quantifies the GDTs using Monte Carlo
simulation. The potential outcomes are modeled in
terms of risk curves. This is in contrast to the use of
Classical DT (CDT) analysis where decisions are based
on EV.
7. Risk curves are used to examine the range of possible
outcomes for specific RRAs and provide the data for
informed cost-benefit tradeoffs.
8. The analysis is updated based on actual results to effec-
tively monitor and control the performance and selec-
tion of RRAs as old risks are retired and new risks arise.
The proposed dynamic risk assessment and management
approach provides a mathematically valid as well as practical
framework for dealing with the dynamic character of project
risks. It builds on the sequential decision analysis model of
Stonebraker and Kirkwood [1997] by assessing the changing
project situation in terms of risk profiles. It thereby provides
DMs with the necessary information to dynamically select or
modify RRAs in accordance with their assessment of future
outcomes and risk tolerance rather than relying solely on EVs.
3. GENERALIZED DECISION TREES FOR
MODELING AND ANALYZING RISK RESPONSE
ACTIONS—SINGLE RISK CASE
We model and analyze each screened risk driver and the
associated candidate RRAs using GDTs. GDTs follow the
standard DT representation. The decision nodes and chance
nodes are depicted as squares and circles, respectively. The
ordering of the decision nodes corresponds to different tem-
poral deterministic events. The branches that originate with
decision nodes represent the available RRAs. The branches
that originate with chance nodes represent the possible prob-
abilistic outcomes. There are two major differences between
the GDT and the classical DT: (1) PDFs rather than discrete
branches are associated with the chance nodes; and (2) the
outcomes are specified as PDFs rather than point estimates or
EVs. GDTs, therefore, provide a powerful technique for deal-
ing with the complex situations typical of many of today’s
projects. They avoid bushy trees, generate risk curves, and
remove the reliance of decision-making based on EVs [Ku-
jawski, 2002]. The comparison between the GDT and the
classical DT is further discussed in Section 3.2.
3.1. Illustrative Example #1—A Single
Technical Risk
To illustrate the approach, we consider the single technical
risk related to the fabrication of a complex first-of-a-kind
module or system. The risk is associated with the probability
that the module may fail and have to be redesigned. This, of
course, has cost and schedule consequences. We focus on the
cost consequences of the following two RRAs: (i) Directly
fabricate the module, which is denoted by the branch labeled
Fab_A2; or (ii) build a prototype and then fabricate the
module, which is denoted by the branch labeled Prototype.
The associated GDT is depicted in Figure 4. A descriptive
label, a probability, and a cost distribution are associated with
each branch. The ordering of the decision nodes corresponds
to the different temporal deterministic events in the develop-
ment and fabrication cycle of the module. The probability and
cost values are conditional on the specific RRA and the
preceding outcomes. The outcomes are collectively exhaus-
tive and mutually exclusive [Papazouglou, 1998]. They are
therefore statistically independent and it would be a mistake
to model them as correlated. To be explicit, the outcome
“Success_A1” depends on the preceding events (Prototype,
Success_A1, and Fab_A1). In contrast, “Success_A1,” “Fail-
Figure 4. Illustrative example #1. Generalized decision tree for the Risk #1 analysis. It depicts the fabrication of a module. To mitigate the
associated technical risk, the project considers two initial RRAs: (i) Directly fabricate the module (branch labeled Fab_A2), or (ii) build a
prototype and then fabricate the module (branch labeled Prototype). WTRC(x, y, z | c) denotes the technical risk cost associated with a
MAIMS-modified Weibull PDF with the specified 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles and allocated or baseline cost c. The cost values are in $K.
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ure_A1F,” “Success_B1,” and “Failure_B1” are mutually
exclusive events and independent events.
The data in Figure 4 are as follows:
1. The cost elements are modelled using three-parameter
Weibull PDFs fitted to the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles
determined in accordance with the DFA method. In this paper,
these PDFs are denoted by Weib(10th, 50th, 90th).
2. The above PDFs are modified in accordance with the
MAIMS principle to account for the fact that account manag-
ers rarely underrun their Originally Allocated Budget (OAB).
The modified PDFs are proper PDFs with a deltalike function
at OAB that account for all values less than or equal to OAB
[Kujawski et al., 2002]. In this paper, these MAIMS-modified
Weibull PDFs are denoted by Weib(10th, 50th, 90th|OAB).
3. The TRC of each RRA is measured relative to the OAB.
It is interesting to note that this is equivalent to the use the
semivariance or value-at-risk concept [Markowitz, 1997].
The TRC is then a random variable given by
WTRC(10th, 50th, 90th|OAB) ≡ Weib(10th, 50th, 90th|OAB) –
OAB. 
4. To be explicit, consider the PDF WTRC(900, 1100,
1400|1100), associated with the top branch labeled Suc-
cess_A1 in Figure 4. The initial PDF Weib(900, 1100, 1400)
corresponds to a three-parameter Weibull distribution with the
following parameters: Location: 797.2, Scale: 373.6, and
Shape: 1.74. The associated mean is 1130. In contrast, the
mean of Weib(900, 1100, 1400|1100) is 1255. This increase
is expected because the minimum value in any trial is now
1100.00. The expected TRC is 155. The cost values should be
thought of as $K.
The selection of a RRA is a deterministic event and only
the outcomes associated with it can be realized. It would,
therefore, be incorrect to weigh or combine the outcomes of
the two RRAs since they represent two mutually exclusive
decisions.
3.1.1. Analysis of the Initial Risk and RRAs
We analyzed each RRA and the potential outcomes using a
commercial Monte Carlo simulation Excel add-in (Crystal
Ball®, to be specific). The PDFs and risk profiles for each
individual RRA at the start of the project are depicted in
Figures 5a, 5b, and 5c. The PDFs (Figs. 5a and 5b) are
multimodal and cannot be represented using any of the PDFs
commonly used in risk analysis [Vose, 2006]. These PDFs
provide significant information. The PDF for the direct fabri-
cation RRA (Fig. 5a) has two high-value modes that corre-
spond to the sequence of events in which (i) only the first
fabrication fails (labeled “Success_B2”) and (ii) the sub-
sequent fabrication following redesign also fails (labeled
“Failure_B2”). The PDF for developing a prototype RRA
(Fig. 5b) exhibits a high-value mode that corresponds to the
outcome in which the fabrication of the module fails (labeled
“Failure_A1F”). The other high-value peak is hardly notice-
able.
The complementary cumulative distribution functions
(CCDF) or “risk curves” shown in Figure 5c provide a more
global picture. The exceedance probability is the probability
of  exceeding a given cost .  For example, the
Risk_Cost(Fab_A2) curve shows that there is ~30% prob-
ability that the TRC will exceed $1100K. For any given value
on the “Risk cost” axis, the risk curve that corresponds to the
lower exceedance probability represents the lower risk. It is
seen from Figure 5c that the “prototype” risk curve is signifi-
cantly lower than the “fabrication” risk curve for all values
greater than ~$200K. The investment of $100K for building
a prototype provides a significant reduction in TRC. For the
manager trying to decide if it is worthwhile to invest in the
prototype option, the answer is to invest as long as the antici-
pated benefits from the prototype (whether it be cost savings,
time savings, information, etc.) exceed $200K and/or if the
low-probability/high-consequence costs of direct fabrication
are unacceptable.
3.1.2. Analysis of the Sequential Risks and RRAs
We use the GDTs to analyze the performance of the candidate
RRAs at key decision points in the project life-cycle. This
information is essential for tracking the residual risk exposure
versus the cost expended on RRAs and modifying the RRAs
as needed to ensure mission success. Figure 6 depicts the risk
curves at the “Prototype” RRA start and after the successful
demonstration of the prototype. These two risk curves repre-
sent the TRC of the risk exposure at two different points in
time and thereby provide a metric for the risk exposure as the
project evolves. The residual risk following a successful pro-
totype is less than the original risk. As expected, the risk curve
moves to the left of the original risk curve and is steeper,
which reflects a reduced risk. In contrast, a risk curve that
moves to the right of the original risk curve means that the
risk exposure is increasing and the selection of RRAs needs
to be reconsidered.
3.2. Today’s De Facto Decision Tree Analysis
There are significant differences between the approach fol-
lowed in this paper and today’s de facto DT analysis, which
we refer to as CDT analysis. While both approaches model
decisions under uncertainty using DTs, much of the valuable
information available in the risk curves is lost in the CDT
“folding back the tree” procedure that calculates the EV of
each alternative. The CDT analysis selects alternatives based
on the highest or lowest EVs depending on the situation
[Clemen and Reilly, 2001: 115]. Many technical managers
however do not favor the use of EV for decision-making. They
consider risk to depend more on the magnitude than the
probability of the undesirable outcomes and therefore not
adequately characterized by its EV [Shapira, 1995]. In addi-
tion, the perception of risk and therefore the preferred RRAs
are specific to the value of the project, the available resources,
and the risk attitude of the DMs.
For completeness and clarity, we performed the CDT
analysis for illustrative example #1. We used the commercial
software, DecisionPro . This tool also includes Monte Carlo
simulation and a limited set of PDFs for use as input values.
(Note: DecisionPro  does not provide the Weibull distribu-
tion.) There are other commercial DT analysis tools that are
equally applicable and solve decision trees using Monte Carlo
MONITORING RISK RESPONSE ACTIONS  357
Systems Engineering DOI 10.1002/sys
Figure 5a. Illustrative example #1. Probability distribution for Risk
#1 outcomes given direct fabrication of the module (sequence start-
ing with branch labeled Fab_A2 in Figure 4). The different possible
outcomes are identified.  [Color figure can be viewed in the online
issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
Figure 5b. Illustrative example #1. Probability distribution for Risk
#1 outcomes given development of a prototype (sequence starting
with branch labeled Prototype in Fig. 4). The different possible
outcomes are identified. The other high-value peak is hardly notice-
able.  [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is
available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
Figure 5c. Illustrative example #1. Risk curves corresponding to the PDFs in Figures 5a and 5b.  [Color figure can be viewed in the online
issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
Figure 6. Illustrative example #1. Risk exposure characteristics for Risk #1 with the development of a prototype at the start of risk mitigation
and after successful demonstration. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
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simulations [Maxwell, 2008]. However, few offer the flexi-
bility of commercial Excel add-ins such as Crystal Ball® and
@Risk to implement the GDT analysis presented in this paper.
A detailed comparison of DT tools is beyond the scope of this
paper.
The resulting CDT is depicted in Figure 7. Its structure is
identical to the GDT in Figure 4. The number immediately
below the branch name corresponds to the point estimate of
the incremental cost associated with the decision or prob-
abilistic outcome. The number below an end branch repre-
sents the point estimate of the TRC if the associated outcome
is realized. The major differences between the CDT and the
GDT are that (1) the PDFs are replaced by their expected
values and (2) the “folding back the tree” procedure is applied
to provide the EVs rather than the cumulative risk profiles
[Clemen and Reilly, 2001: 132]. The CDT analysis thereby
discards the alternatives with the inferior expected values
regardless of the range of the possible outcomes. In this
example, the CDT analysis yields EVs of $305K and $689K
for the Prototype and Fab_A2 options. We note that these
values are the EVs provided by the GDT analysis; this is as it
should be. However, the GDT analysis also provides the
cumulative risk curves, which is valuable information for the
decision-maker.
4. THE QUANTIFICATION OF MULTIPLE
PROJECT RISKS
Consider a project with n credible technical risks {Ri, i = 1,
…, n}. Each risk, Ri, is characterized by a probability of
occurrence pi and a spectrum of possible outcomes with a PDF
Li(Xi = xi), where Xi is a random variable that quantifies either
the possible technical performance, cost, or schedule out-
comes. This paper focuses on cost including technical TRC.
One may then think of this set of risks as a risk portfolio
[Kujawski and Miller, 2007] with a generalized discrete PDF,
RS(XS = X1 + X2 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + Xn = x) =
















The technical project costs in Eq. (1) may be probabilistically
dependent [Dillon-Merill et al., 2008]. The dependencies are
project-unique and need to be reassessed as the project situ-
ation changes and the risk picture evolves. For example, the
technical performance and the cost or time to complete one
module may depend on the performance and availability of
another module. In this situation, the probability and cost
values for a given risk are conditional on one or more other
risks. The dependencies between the different risks can be
either explicitly modeled or empirically accounted for using
correlation coefficients. Explicit modeling of the depend-
encies eliminates the need for correlation coefficients. When-
ever possible, the modeling of the dependencies is preferred
to the use of empirical correlation coefficients [Garvey, 2000:
283]. It is tempting to use rank-order correlation because they
can be easily input in commercial simulation tools (Crystal
Ball®, @Risk, DecisionPro , etc.); however, this could lead
to erroneous results especially when dependencies have al-
ready accounted for [Garvey, 2000: 333; Salmon, 2009].
As depicted in Figure 2, the total project cost is a random
variable that consists of the sum of the m base cost elements
and the explicitly identified TRCs. Depending on the situ-
ation, the m base cost elements {BCi, i = 1, …, m} may be
modeled as point estimates or random variables {Yi, i = 1, …,
m }with continuous PDFs, which we denote by BCi(yi). In
general, n is not equal to m since some cost elements may have
multiple risks while some have none. The total project cost is
Figure 7. Illustrative example #1. Classical decision tree analysis for the Risk #1 analysis. The structure is identical with the generalized decision
tree in Figure 4. Each PDF has been replaced by its expected value, and the “folding back the tree” procedure has been applied to obtain the
EVs for the two options.
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then a random variable with a PDF that is the probabilistic
sum of the m base cost elements and n risk-driver costs:
TC(Z = ∑ 
i=1
m
Yi + ∑ 
i=1
n




BCi(yi) + RS(x1, x2, . . . , xn),
(2)
where BCi(yi) is the PDF for the base cost element BCi and
RS(x1, x2, …, xn) is given by Eq. (1).
Equation (2) can be computed using commercial Monte
Carlo simulation tools such as Crystal Ball® and @Risk.
These tools also provide tornado charts that conveniently
quantify the importance of the various risk drivers and their
link to the overall cost risk. Projects can use this information
to rank the risks and prioritize RRAs. This is in sharp contrast
with: (1) the use of point estimates that are at best ambiguous
because overly confident staff provide low cost estimates,
while others may inflate their cost estimates to make it easier
to achieve success; (2) the use of S-curves that provide a
limited “black box” view of project risks and cost uncertainty;
and (3) decision-making based solely on qualitative assess-
ments.
4.1. Developing Total Project Risk Response
Actions
Developing RRAs is a creative process that may require
generating new and innovative ideas [Hall, 1998: 141]. There
are typically many RRAs for a particular source of risk. The
morphological box approach [Sage and Armstrong, 2000] can
be used to obtain useful insight into the solution space and
identify a set of preferred RRAs. At a minimum, a project
should consider the following three categories of RRAs for
each risk [Kujawski, 2002]: (1) Accept the risk as is; (2)
immediately implement risk reduction actions such as select-
ing alternative designs, switching or using multiple vendors,
modifying the requirements, and/or pursing parallel paths; or
(3) obtain additional information by investing in additional
analysis, testing, and/or prototyping. These three RRAs ade-
quately characterize the basic RRA options with little or no
loss of generality and, if deemed necessary, they can be
combined to provide more comprehensive or higher-level
RRAs.
If there are many risks each with multiple RRAs, the set of
all possible Total Project RRAs (TPRRAs) may be quite large
and the analysis can be automated. However, computers are
no substitute for critical thinking [Dixit and Nalebuff, 2008:
121]. It is therefore important to examine techniques that help
reduce the set of TPPRAs and provide deeper insight into the
solution. Design of Experiments (DOE) provides a method
that can be used to define a fractional factorial design [Crevel-
ing, Slutsky, and Antis, 2003] for use in determining the
preferred set of RRAs. This has the potential to greatly reduce
the analysis effort and simplify the task of interpreting the
results.
A project with multiple risks should at a minimum con-
sider the following three strategies based on the three RRA
categories discussed above:
—Strategy 1, accept all project risks as is. The project
recognizes the existence of the risks; however, it con-
siders it acceptable to simply monitor them using their
standard approach.
—Strategy 2, immediately implement RRAs for every
project risk. This is rarely realistic or feasible given
schedule and budget considerations. However, it pro-
vides information on what it might cost to essentially
eliminate technical risk from the project.
—Strategy 3, select RRAs that provide a good Return on
Investment (ROI) [Hall, 1998] based on the traditional
expected value and/or the low-probability/high-conse-
quence outcomes.
4.1.1 Applying ROI to the Selection of RRAs
Hall [1998: 143] defines the risk management ROI as “the
savings for all managed risks divided by the total cost of the
risk management activities.” Since we are interested in both
the expected values and the low-probability/high-conse-
quence outcomes, we define the ROI at different exceedance
probabilities [Gogolkiewicz, 2007] as the ratio of the condi-
tional expected value [Haimes, 2004: 308] of the TRC reduc-
tion divided by the cost of implementing the TPRRAs:





















where p(x) is the PDF for the TRC. When c = 0, Eq. (3) reduces
to the traditional ROI. The bracketed expression in the right-
hand side of Eq. (3) represents the conditional loss or TRC
associated with outcomes greater than or equal to c.
There is some danger in applying the ROI for ranking
RRAs since it does not explicitly identify the RRA costs. The
ROI may mislead the unwary to a RRA that is beyond a
reasonable investment [Melese, 2007]. Similarly, comparing
RRAs at a single confidence level or exceedance probability
is not a robust method because it does not consider all of the
complete range of the outcomes. Another approach is to
directly compare the risk PFDs and/or CCDFs. It is rare that
a RRA exhibits first-order stochastic dominance. However,
these distributions provide DMs full visibility into all of the
potential outcomes. DMs can rank or select the RRAs depend-
ing on their attitudes toward risk and. budget constraints.
4.2. Illustrative Example #2—A Project with Three
Technical Risks
Consider the hypothetical project with the three technical
risks scenarios depicted in Figures 4, 8a, and 8b. This example
is both rich and simple enough to illustrate: (1) several diverse
RRAs and their analysis, (2) the dynamic nature of the risk
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picture, (3) the importance of continuous risk monitoring, and
(4) the dynamic allocation of resources as a critical aspect of
continuous risk management.
The Risk #1 scenario is identical to illustrative example #1.
The associated GDT is depicted in Figure 4. The Risk #2
scenario with its associated GDT depicted in Figure 8a may
be thought of as a prime contractor who subcontracts the
engineering and fabrication of a complex module. The tech-
nical risk is associated with the probability that the subcon-
tractor fails to deliver a module that performs to the technical
requirements and the cost of the rework. We examine the
TRCs of the following two RRAs: (i) Subcontract to a single
contractor A, denoted by the branch PDR_A; and (ii) subcon-
tract to two contractors and select the best one for fabrication
of the module at a contractual design review, denoted by the
branch PDR_AB. By initiating two different contractors with
different offerings, the prime significantly reduces the prob-
ability of failure. The RW branches represent the different
costs associated with rework. We do not invoke the MAIMS
principle when dealing with rework. The cost of each of
rework branch is modeled with a three-parameter Weibull
distribution specified in terms of the 90th, 50th, and 10th
percentiles, which are provided by SMEs or based on relevant
historical data. 
The GDT for Risk #3 is depicted Figure 8b. The Risk #3
scenario may be thought of a prime contractor who considers
two different Verification and Validation (V&V) strategies as
a means of risk reduction. The technical risk is associated with
the probability that the design problems are not identified
prior to fabrication and the cost of the rework. The branches
labeled VVS_1_Start and VVS_2_Start represent implement-
ing the standard approach with planned expenditures of
$300K and a very thorough V&V effort with planned expen-
diture of $1000K, respectively. The rework is assumed to be
inversely related to the V&V effort and it is modeled with a
three-parameter Weibull distribution. We note that V&V de-
serves a thorough analysis rather than simply considering two
RRAs as assumed in this illustrative example. Engel and
Barad [2003] have proposed a methodology for developing
V&V strategies and selecting an optimal one. Their approach
can be integrated within the framework presented in this
paper.
We assume that the three risks in this illustrative example
are associated with distinct technical risk factors and noncon-
flicting resources. It is therefore proper to model them as
independent. In the case of probabilistically dependent risks,
the dependencies should be explicitly modeled or, if neces-
sary, accounted for using correlation coefficients as discussed
in Section 4.1.
4.2.1. Analysis of the Initial Set of Risks and RRAs
Given three technical risks each with two potential RRAs,
there are eight possible initial total projects RRAs (TPRRA)
that the project may opt to implement. Figure 9 depicts the
morphological chart for the three risks and the identified
RRAs. We analyze each of the individual three RRAs as
described in Sections 3.1 and 4.1. The Risk #1, Risk #2, and
Risk #3 profiles and ROI values for the mean and the 50th and
80th exceedance probabilities are presented in Figures 10a,
10b, and 10c, respectively. Based on these results, we consider
the three TPRRAs in the alternatives matrix depicted in Figure
11:
Figure 8a. Illustrative example #2. Generalized decision tree for the
Risk #2 analysis. It depicts a prime contractor who subcontracts the
engineering and fabrication of a complex module. To mitigate the
associated technical risk, the project considers two initial RRAs: (i)
Subcontract to a single contractor A (branch labeled PDR_A), or (ii)
subcontract to two contractors and selecting the best one for fabri-
cation at a contractual design review (branch labeled PDR_AB).
Weib(x, y, z) is the three-parameter Weibull distribution specified in
terms of the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles for rework costs.
Figure 8b. Illustrative example #2. Generalized decision tree for the
Risk #3 analysis. It depicts a prime contractor who considers two
different V&V strategies as means for risk reduction: (i) use of the
standard V&V approach (branch labeled VVS_1_Start), or (ii) use
of a very thorough V&V approach (branch labeled VVS_2_Start).
Weib(x, y, z) is defined in Figure 8a.
Figure 9. Illustrative example #2. Morphological chart for the three
hypothesized technical risks.
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Strategy #1. Use of the lowest cost option for each risk,
which is equivalent to proceeding as normal; i.e., do not
implement specific RRAs for any of the three risks.
This corresponds to: (1) Risk #1, directly fabricate the
module; (2) Risk #2, proceed with a single contractor;
and (3) Risk #3, implement the standard V&V effort.
Strategy #2. Use the most effective RRA for each risk. It
is the approach that a risk-averse project manager
would favor if he had sufficient funding. This corre-
sponds to: (1) Risk #1, develop a prototype; (2) Risk
#2, proceed with two contractors for; and (3) Risk #3,
implement the very thorough V&V effort.
Strategy #3. Select the RRAs based on the ROI as de-
scribed in Section 4.1. This corresponds to: (1) Risk #1,
develop a prototype; (2) Risk #2, proceed with two
contractors; and (3) Risk #3, implement the standard
V&V effort.
The three strategies are compared in Figure 12. Strategy
#1 is practically dominated by Strategy #3. This is consistent
with the Risk #3 risk curves and low ROI values depicted in
Figure 10a. Illustrative example #2. Risk curves and ROI table for Risk #1 at start. The risk curves are identical to Figure 5c. The risk curves
are replicated for convenience. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
Figure 10b. Illustrative example #2. Risk curves and ROI table for Risk #2 at start. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is
available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
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Figure 10c. The project could therefore eliminate Strategy #1
from further consideration.
4.2.2. Analysis of Risk Dynamics 
We now focus on the analysis of the dynamics of the RRAs
and how this information may influence the selection and
management of the RRAs. Without loss of generality we
illustrate the process using Strategies #1 and #2. The identical
analysis applies to Strategy #3; however, Strategy #1 empha-
sizes the shortcomings of implementing the very thorough
V&V effort.
Figure 10c. Illustrative example #2. Risk curves and ROI table for Risk #3 at start. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is
available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
Figure 11. Alternatives matrix of the three TPRRAs selected for
further analysis.
Figure 12. Illustrative example #2. Comparison of three strategies for the initial selection of RRAs. [Color figure can be viewed in the online
issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
MONITORING RISK RESPONSE ACTIONS  363
Systems Engineering DOI 10.1002/sys
Optimistic view. For each strategy, we assume the best
possible outcomes for the first probabilistic nodes, which for
convenience we identify by the time of occurrence, T*.
—The Risk #1 prototype and the Risk #2 review PDR_AB
succeed.
—Risk #3 is continuously monitored and the risk reduction
is directly accounted in the magnitude of the rework.
Pessimistic view. For each strategy, we assume the worst
outcomes for the first probabilistic nodes, which for conven-
ience we identify by the time of occurrence, T*.
—The Risk #1 prototype and the Risk #2 review PDR_AB
fail.
—Risk #3 is continuously monitored and the risk reduction
is directly accounted in the magnitude of the rework.
Figures 13 and 14 depict the initial and residual risks under
Strategies #1 and #2, assuming the best and worse outcomes,
respectively. These data provide bounds for the risk range that
may threaten the project following implementation of the
initial set of RRAs. Figure 15 depicts these bounds. This is
useful information that can be used to avoid analyzing the full
factorial set of RRAs and to focus on fractional factorial sets
of RRAs including orthogonal arrays [Huynh et al., 2009].
Figure 13. Illustrative example #2. Risk exposure characteristics for Strategies #1 and #2, assuming the best possible outcomes at the 2nd
decision points; i.e., good luck prevails on the project for the initial set of risk response actions. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue,
which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
Figure 14. Illustrative example #2. Risk exposure characteristics for Strategies #1 and #2 assuming that assuming the worse possible outcomes
at the 2nd decision points; i.e., Murphy’s Law prevails on the project for the initial set of risk response actions. [Color figure can be viewed in
the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
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The dynamic picture of risk and the value of monitoring risk
are further discussed in the next section.
5. THE VALUE OF MONITORING RISK 
Figures 13 and 14 illustrate the value of monitoring the
performance of Strategies #1 and #2 in terms of the TRC.
When the best outcomes are realized, both strategies reduce
the TRC. As depicted in Figure 13, both T* curves move to
the left and become narrower than the start risk curves.
Likewise, if the worst outcome prevails as assumed in Figure
14, then both strategies actually increase the cost risk expo-
sure of the project. Graphing risk curves over time thus
provides a metric to measure the success of risk mitigation
efforts.
Figures 13, 14, and 15 provide additional quantitative
information that can help the project rationally choose the
preferred strategy. Under the best-case scenario (Fig. 13), at
the start of the project Strategy #1 offers a lower risk exposure
below $1500K while Strategy #2 offers a lower risk exposure
above that value. Both strategies are equal in terms of ex-
ceedance probability (60%) at the “breakeven” point of
$1500K. What does the project manager gain by extending
the analysis to time T*? He or she gains the information that
the “breakeven” point is lower ($1200K) and the risk at that
point is also lower (40%). So, which one is the best choice?
The optimistic project manager most likely assumes that the
best outcome would be realized and thereby makes a choice
based on his/her anticipated benefits. But, of course, there is
no such assurance, so let’s examine the worst-case scenario.
Figure 14 shows the results of implementing each strategy
over time assuming the worst outcome (Murphy’s Law). As
expected, the “accept the risk as is” Strategy #1 significantly
increases the project cost risk exposure when things go bad;
but the more conservative Strategy #2 is much less sensitive
to bad outcomes. In fact, at T* Strategy #2 dominates Strategy
#1; i.e., it has a lower risk for any value. For pessimists, the
choice is simple: Strategy #2 is especially effective in provid-
ing insurance against the worst outcomes. Which strategy is
chosen depends on the DMs risk aversion and available re-
sources. Is he/she an optimist or a pessimist? We believe
examining risk information in this way provides useful insight
and helps project managers make better choices.
6. CONCLUSIONS
6.1. Lessons Learned
This paper presents a method for evaluating and tracking
project-specific risks at the micro level as well as cost overrun
at the macro level. This type of analysis, as opposed to the
purely macro-level risk analysis, is essential for risk manage-
ment. While the macro level provides some information about
total cost risk, the micro level allows the project manager to
plan and control risk response actions that influence total cost
risk. A simplified project with three technical risks was used
to illustrate (1) the portfolio aspect of multiple RRAs and their
analysis, (2) the dynamic nature of the risk picture, and (3)
the monitoring of individual risks and allocation of manage-
ment reserves.
This paper demonstrates the use of GDTs to model the
evolution of the potential RRAs, and risk curves to evaluate
the cost risk. The authors believe risk curves are better than
the EV results given by CDT analysis because they contain
all the risk information both in terms of probabilities and the
value at risk. Risk curves derived from Monte Carlo simula-
tion of GDTs are particularly useful for comparing different
risk-mitigation strategies. The “breakeven” points help the
risk manager understand the conditions under which each
strategy is most appropriate. Combined with scenario analy-
sis, it offers an opportunity to make cost-benefit tradeoffs
among strategies. This thorough approach allows manage-
ment to consider what they mean by “acceptable” risk and
explicitly models the tradeoff between risk and benefit for a
given RRA. Tracking the performance of RRAs over time is
key to understanding the dynamic nature of risk management
and defining essential changes in strategy. It enables a project
to shift from allocating resources to each risk and the initially
selected set of RRAs to making the decisions based on the
observed development. This dynamic allocation of resources
reduces the total risk project by eliminating the need to
assume best cases, worst cases, or expected values for the
Figure 15. Illustrative example #2. Bounds on the project TRC following implementation of Strategies #1 and #2. [Color figure can be viewed
in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
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outcomes for the technical risks. The proposed approach
provides the detailed information that project managers need
and want when they face hard decisions on projects. There is
a cost; but it is small considering the potential benefits.
6.2. Future Research and Implementation
The proposed approach is both practical and mathematically
valid. The use of fractional factorial designs based orthogonal
arrays [Huynh et al., 2009] offers a method to greatly reduce
the analysis effort and simplify the task of determining the
preferred set of RRAs. To the best of our knowledge, no
current commercial tool fully automates the generation and
analysis of the proposed generalized decision trees and the
time dependence. For additional details, we refer the inter-
ested reader to the recent decision analysis software survey
by Maxwell [2008]. One of the referees suggested that the
proposed approach can be readily implemented using VBA in
Excel. We concur that this is a very viable approach. However,
we consider software development beyond the scope of this
paper.
For a given risk, the ordering of the decision nodes in a DT
corresponds to different temporal deterministic events in the
development and fabrication cycle of the module. The prob-
ability and cost values are conditional on the specific RRA
and the preceding outcomes and account for these depend-
encies. The use of correlation coefficients would double count
correlations. There may also be dependencies between differ-
ent risks. Whenever possible, the modeling of the depend-
encies is preferred to the use of empirical correlation
coefficients. Correlation coefficients should only be used to
account for identified dependencies that cannot be explicitly
modeled. The modeling of the dependencies among different
risks deserves close scrutiny and further investigation.
We note that dynamic risk assessment and management
has been proposed to enhance the safety of complex systems
[Paté-Cornell and Regan, 1998] and enhance situational
awareness [Kobylski et al., 2008]. We think that there are
likely to be complementarities between these risk areas and
the management of technical project risks that are worth
investigating.
The next phase is to further develop the methodology and
an integrated tool to aid project managers select a portfolio of
risk reduction activities that maximizes the cost and schedule
benefits of such activities in accordance with the available
resources and his/her risk attitude. The dynamic nature of the
approach allows the program manager to monitor and manage
the performance of risk reduction activities over time and
optimize the allocation of risk management resources over the
life-cycle of the project. The challenge is to start implement-
ing these more refined cost models and risk management
practices.
7. ACRONYMS
CCDF Complementary Cumulative Distribution Func-
tion
CDT Classical Decision Tree
DBM Driver-Based Monte-Carlo
DFA Direct Fractile Assessment
DM Decision-Maker
DOE Design Of Experiments
DT Decision Tree
EV Expected Value
GDT Generalized Decision Tree
MAIMS Money Allocated Is Money Spent
OAB Originally Allocated Budget
PCRA Probabilistic Cost Risk Analysis
PDF Probability Distribution Function
ROI Return on Investment
RRA Risk Response Action
SME Subject Matter Expert
TPRRA Total Project RRA
TRC Technical Risk Cost
TRL Technology Readiness Level 
V&V Verification and Validation
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